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A median voter model is used to test the hypothesis that changes 
In the level of employment in a political jurisdiction--in this 
case, Montana counties--will positively affect the quantity of 
public goods demanded by the decisive voter in that jurisdiction. 
The theoretical and empirical development of the median voter 
model is traced over its half-century life and the theory's 
assumptions are made explicit.
In order to test the maintained hypothesis, a "demand function" 
for the median (decisive) voter was formulated with county 
expenditures acting as proxy for the quantity demanded. This 
quantity was posited as a function of several variables. Including 
the employment change variables needed to test the maintained 
hypothesis, demographic variables, and the more "traditional" 
demand function variables median income and tax price. A number 
of other "price" variables were included in the model in order to 
more accurately capture the true marginal cost of public goods.
The costs of such goods are borne both by members of the 
community, who can vote for those who levy taxes to finance public 
goods, and by nonresidents, who can not vote and, presumably, have 
little say In determining their tax bills. Of particular 
Importance were variables Intended to reflect the cost of public 
goods paid by someone other than the median voter.
No empirical evidence was found to support the hypothesized 
relationship between the quantity of public goods demanded and 
changes In the community's employment level. However, the results 
of the model Indicated that the median voter formulation most 
often used in other studies of public expenditures is incomplete 
and should be augmented with the additional "price" variables (or 
Improved versions of those variables) Introduced in this study.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to test the maintained hypothesis, 
which is, briefly stated, that a change in the type and level of 
employment in a political jurisdiction will positively affect that 
jurisdiction's level of public expenditures. There are a number of 
reasons to believe this to be true. The primary reason is that economic 
activity, measured by employment growth, necessitates greater public 
spending. As business activity increases, one would expect growing 
political pressures placed on local government to expand spending on 
business- and residential-related services.
A number of economists and other social scientists have attempted 
to measure the marginal costs to the public sector of growth in 
employment. Such studies have most often utilized the statistical tool 
of multiple regression. The authors of these studies have all 
recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that in order to properly 
test the role of employment growth in the determination of public 
expenditures, a model of public expenditure determination must exist.
In other words, employment growth is not the only determinant of the 
level of public expenditures, and measures of that growth must not be 
the only independent variables in such a regression model. Thus, a 
necessary first step in testing the relationship between employment 
growth and public spending is the construction of a model of public 
expenditures which both "explains" the variation in public expenditures
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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In a statistical sense and provides a reasonable behavioral explanation 
for their variation. Such a model would, if itself adequate to 
"explain" a sufficient portion of this variation, provide a context for 
testing any additional effects employment changes might have on 
expenditures.
Testing of the employment-spending relationship has been the 
primary purpose of this study. However, it soon became apparent that the 
construction of the behavioral and statistical models with which to test 
this relationship was the more challenging and theoretically interesting 
portion of the project. Thus, the bulk of this paper, and the most 
theoretically significant conclusions reached, concern the continuing 
developments of appropriate theories and techniques for the modeling of 
public expenditures; the role of employment in determining such 
expenditures seems of secondary importance.
Chapter Two outlines the major features of the behavioral model 
chosen as a context for testing the maintained hypothesis, the median 
voter model. Researchers had examined the determinants of public 
expenditures long before the theoretical outlines of this model were 
delineated. However, models constructed without the aid of the median 
voter model (or any other broad theoretical construct) were 
statistically inferior to those constructed according to the median 
voter theory.
With such results in mind, and with the firm conviction that 
statistical testing should not be done without reference to a guiding 
theory, this researcher chose to test the maintained hypothesis in the 
context of the median voter model. This decision does not reflect
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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acceptance of the median voter model as a "true" representation of the 
process that determines the level of public spending; it merely results 
from a recognition that median voter models have been among the most 
successful of public expenditure models (as judged by statistical 
criteria).
Chapter Three outlines the evolution of public expenditure analysis 
and demonstrates some of the reasoning used, tested, and abandoned by 
past researchers. Chapter Four outlines the functional form and the 
independent and dependent variables used in the regression equations. 
Chapter Five gives the results of those regressions. Chapter Six 
contains a discussion of theoretical implications of the regressions and 
the conclusions reached.
A more complete and accurate model of public expenditures is 
important. This papers seeks to improve upon existing public 
expenditure models. An improved model could be of great practical 
Importance as well as theoretical interest. Taxpayers, for instance, 
will want to know whether and to what extent their tax bills will be 
affected by employment growth. The regressions presented here will not 
address such a question directly, but they will lead toward greater 
understanding of the process which determines both taxing and spending.
Government planners will want to have a better model for predicting 
expenditure levels. These regressions should be of direct application 
to such questions. The planners will want to know, in effect, whether 
employment growth will pay for itself by expanding the local tax base 
enough to cover expenditure growth. Because multiple regression models 
effectively hold all other variables in the equation constant while
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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estimating the coefficients for each variable, these regressions will 
address the planners' questions about both taxing and spending.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER TWO 
THE BEHAVIORAL MODEL
In recent years, economists have modeled political behavior 'as If' 
it were driven by the same narrow self interests used in the purely 
economic models of producer and consumer behavior. In other words, 
they began to develop an economic, as opposed to a political, theory of 
collective decision making which has come to be known as public choice.
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE
The theory of public choice attempts to explain the outcomes of 
collective decision making by modeling society as if it were composed of 
rational, self-interested voters and politicians. Although government 
taxing and spending decisions are essentially political decisions made 
through a group process, public choice theory attempts to analyze such 
policies through an examination of the motivations of the individuals 
which make up that group, rather than an exploration of the dynamics of 
the collective.
Voters and politicians, it is assumed, attempt to maximize, 
respectively, their utility and votes, just as consumers and producers 
in the private marketplace attempt to maximize utility and profits.
With this model, economists have attempted to explain how voters 
actually "choose" the basket of public goods and services they receive 
from government. Economists using this model have met with limited but 
significant success in attempting to explain, in both theoretical and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
statistical senses, the variations in public expenditures across 
political jurisdictions.
POLITICIANS, VOTERS, AND THE MEDIAN VOTER
The model assumes that the politician, qua politician, sees his or 
her personal welfare as linked with holding office and thus seeks to 
maximize the votes he or she receives by adopting policies and positions 
which will appeal to as many voters as possible. The politician is 
thought to accomplish this by appealing to the so-called "median 
voter.
In order to model the outcome of political processes, public choice 
theorists assume that collective decisions will be determined by the 
outcome of a vote, with the preference of the majority, i.e. fifty 
percent of the electorate plus one, prevailing. It is assumed that 
voters are aware of the tax schedule and the public goods and services 
for which they pay. It is also assumed that voters 'sincerely' (i.e.
^Howard R.Bowen, "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of 
Economic Resources," Quarterly Journal of Economics 53 (February 1943); 27-48. 
In this ground-breaking theoretical work, Bowen referred to the "modal" rather 
than the "median" voter. However, he had assumed a normal distribution of 
voter preferences, so the two were identical. Many public finance texts 
contain detailed and somewhat more tractable discussions of what is today 
called the median voter. For instance, see the public choice chapters in 
Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) and Buchanan and Flowers (1980). All voters are 
assumed to be both consumers of public goods, to some extent, and taxpayers 
who will pay a share of the cost of producing and providing the goods. The 
rational voter will, in determining his or her own preference for public goods 
and services, weigh personal costs and benefits (at the margin). The model 
does not assume that voters will support policies which are efficient from a 
social point of view, only that they will support policies which will produce 
net benefits for them personally.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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truthfully) express their public goods preferences in elections that 
and those preferences can be ordered on a continuum of low to high 
demands for public goods. The preferences of voters are said to be 
'single peaked," i.e. they are ordered in a transitory manner. Under 
these conditions, the preference of the voter "in the middle"--the 
median voter--will prevail.^ Even in the unlikely event that the vote 
is as evenly split as possible, with just under half of the electorate 
voting one way and just over half voting the other, the median voter is 
assured of being on the winning side. In such an electoral outcome, the 
votes of all other electors offset one another and the median voter's 
vote determines the outcome. Of course, the median voter will clearly 
be in the winning camp if the vote is less evenly divided.
Thus, the voter who occupies the political median. the middle 
ground of the political spectrum, determines the outcome of elections.̂  
Public choice theorists go a step further, however, in an attempt to 
identify this powerful elector. They assume that the person at the 
political median also occupies the economic median.̂  This further
^Robert P. Inman, "Testing Political Economy's 'As If' Proposition: Is 
the Median Income Voter Really Decisive?" Social Science Quarterly 33 (1978): 
45.
^Randall G. Holcombe, "Concepts of Public Sector Equilibrium," National 
Tax Journal 43 (March 1980): 79. While the outcomes of elections can not be 
claimed to be economically efficient, they do represent points of agreement 
among the electorate and can thus be called points of "equilibrium."
''Ibid. , p.p. 45-65. Inman's intent in this study was to test the 
validity of the median voter hypothesis. He tested the hypothesis by
regressing the log of school expenditures per pupil on four alternative sets
of independent variables using both ordinary least squares and two-stage least 
squares. In all formulations the coefficients on the median tax share and 
median income variables were statistically significant, relatively stable, and
of the theoretically correct sign.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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assumption allows the median voter to be Identified as the owner of the 
median-valued residential property In the jurisdiction and also the 
earner of the median income. In this way the public choice theorist 
greatly simplifies, and probably over-simplifies, the "distribution" of 
political preferences. According to this model, political preferences 
precisely parallel economic interests. Such a model of voter behavior 
seems justified when the issues to be decided are purely or mostly 
financial; when voters have a choice of more or less spending on some 
governmentally provided good or service they can be expected to decide 
largely on the basis of self interest and their own financial 
capabilities.5 Many social scientists have modeled school levy 
elections in this way and they seem to have met with considerable 
success. It is apparently not unreasonable to assume that the voter has 
a reasonably good idea of what passage of the levy will cost him or her 
personally and an estimate of his or her personal benefit from the good 
or service.
Inman concluded that "using the median income voter appears to be a 
reasonable first-order approximation to the process of local government 
politics in this sample of single service governments." (emphasis added) 
However, he also urged the inclusion of political variables in expenditure 
equations, noting
chat the cost of such inclusion was low and the information gains significant
^Edgar K. Browning and Jacqueline M. Browning, Public Finance and the 
Price System 2nd edition (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1983) p. 
56.
While all voters make these calculations, or at least act as if they made 
them, only the preferences of the median voter are realized through the 
electoral process. Thus, neither society as a whole nor the majority of 
voters get what they want. Under the best of circumstances, only the median 
voter achieves an outcome that equates the marginal costs with the marginal 
benefits of the provision and consumption of public goods.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
THE DEMAND FOR PUBLIC GOODS
One of the potentially more important applications of the theory of 
the median voter has been in the estimation of local public 
expenditures.® Some economists feel that, with several assumptions, 
they can measure public goods and services in terms of expenditures and 
can statistically estimate a demand function for them.^ The assumption 
that the unit cost of public goods is constant with changing output 
makes expenditures proportional to the quantity of goods and services 
provided regardless of the quantity supplied, and thus suitable as a 
proxy for quantity in statistical (regression) models. A further 
assumption that unit costs are constant across political jurisdictions 
allows for cross-sectional analysis of expenditures.
In such models, the voters' expenditure preferences are posited as 
a function of prices, incomes, and tastes and preferences, just as is 
commonly done for the demand for private goods. The demand function is 
written
G - f(t,y,x)
where G is the individual's expenditure preference, t is his or her 
"tax price," y is the individual's income, and x is a vector of the
®Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice (New York; Cambridge University Press 
1979) p. 106.
^Robert T. Deacon, "Private Choice and Collective Outcomes: 
Evidence From Public Sector Demand Analysis," National Tax Journal 40 
(December 1977): 374
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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voter's tastes and preferences. Two of these variables, tax price and 
the vector of tastes and preferences, may be a bit unfamiliar and 
require explanation.
The tax price, t. is the "price" faced by the individual for his or 
her consumption of public goods and services. Since unit costs are 
assumed to be constant, tax price is proportional to the amount the tax 
bill changes with a marginal change in expenditures. In a political 
system in which all goods and services are paid for with property tax 
revenues, tax price can be modeled as proportional to the ratio of the 
value of the voter's property to that of the jurisdiction's entire 
property tax base.
Of course, local governments almost always finance goods and 
services with additional sources of funds, and if any of these other 
sources of funds are taxes other than property taxes they should be 
represented in the demand function through additional tax price 
variables. For instance, where the local government is partially 
financed through a sales tax, an additional tax variable should reflect 
this. This additional variable is required to account for the full 
effect of the expenditure-related costs on the voter. For instance, John 
Beck, in his study of the public expenditures of California 
municipalities, felt the need to incorporate a sales tax variable in his 
demand function since these municipalities derived a substantial 
proportion of their tax revenue from a state-wide sales tax.® His
®John H. Beck, "Nonmonotonic Demand for Municipal Services: 
Variation Among Communities," National Tax Journal 48 (March, 1984): 59 
61.
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formulation thus Included both property tax and sales tax variables.
Beck felt the property tax variable represented the voter's marginal 
price while the sales tax variable, which represented a tax whose rate 
was constant for all voters, could not be thought of as a price per se. 
It should be noted that Beck's tax variables were specified as mean, 
rather than median values; the marginal tax price was specified as tax 
base per capita and the sales tax variable was revenue per capita. The 
income variable, however, was specified as median family income in the 
jurisdiction.
The variable for income, y , serves precisely the same purpose the 
income variable serves in demand functions for private goods and 
services; it indicates the consumer's ability to pay for the item in 
question. Again, this demand function models the behavior of the median 
voter and the median voter is assumed to have the median income in the 
jurisdiction. Consequently, economists in recent years have used 
either median family or median household income in such models. Family 
income appears to be used most often, but a case can be made for use of 
household income when the tax-supported expenditures of the governments 
under study are paid for exclusively or primarily with property taxes.
The vector of tastes and preferences, x. represents a number of 
characteristics that describe the voter and thus indicate what sort of 
goods and services he or she is likely to desire, and in what quantity 
A number of variables have been used in such demand analysis studies. 
They are chosen to fit the level of government and type of expenditures 
studied.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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CRITICISMS OF THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL
It should be noted that not all economists feel the median voter 
"theorem" has been adequately tested. Thomas Romer and Howard 
Rosenthal, in a 1979 article, pointed out methodological errors in the 
application of the theorem. They complained that this formulation was 
far too infrequently compared to alternative formulations which account 
for political institutions, such as control of agendas, or simple 
statistical alternatives, such as mean income and tax prices rather than 
median.^
These authors also point to two logical fallacies that challenge 
the primacy of the median voter's preferences in determining the 
outcome of elections. The first is the "multiple fallacy," by which 
Romer and Rosenthal argue that the ordinary least squares models that 
are often used to test the median voter formulation are not sensitive 
to the absolute amount of spending preferred by the median voter; they 
may provide a perfectly acceptable statistical "fit" to the data even 
though the median voter actually prefers some multiple of the observed 
spending level. The second logical fallacy, "the fractile fallacy," 
arises because any fractile of income and tax price would do as well as 
median values in certain formulations of the model.
Finally, there are several studies in which median tax price 
appears to be statistically significant but median income does not, or 
vice versa. Such results simply defy usual economic expectations and
^Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, "The Elusive Median Voter," 
Journal of Public Economics 12 (1979): 143-70.
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suggest that the logical and statistical explanation of public 
expenditures requires a model much more complex than a simple demand 
function.
Also, while some researchers have affirmed the validity of the 
median voter model, they have qualified their findings. Economists 
such as Robert Inman have endorsed the median voter formulation for the 
study of single service governments such as school districts, but have 
stopped short of recommending the model for the study of multiple 
service providers, such as municipal and county governments. Werner 
Pommerehne has found that this model works best for 'explaining' the 
level of public expenditures in direct democracies with referenda. 
Confirmation of the usefulness of the model under such carefully 
delineated circumstances says little or nothing of its usefulness in the 
study of expenditures determined by representative bodies.
However, other researchers have gone further (perhaps too far) and 
assumed that the voter has sufficient information about candidates to 
know whether they favor more or less spending on a particular good or 
service and how much. The voter, in effect, makes a decision not only 
on the candidate but also on the budget. The assumption that a voter 
can assess his or her marginal costs and benefits of a public good or 
service when the price is virtually spelled out for him or her is one 
thing. An assumption that the voter can somehow glean comparable
’■^Werner W. Pommerehne, "Institutional Approaches to Public 
Expenditure,"
Journal of Public Economics 9 (April, 1978) 255-280.
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infoinnation from a candidate's campaign and his party's platform is 
quite another.
This latter assumption is far less compelling than the first. 
Campaign promises and platforms are, by nature, vague sorts of things 
and often are not adhered to anyway. Also, the voter can never really 
know beforehand what issues will be coming before the elected official. 
Under such circumstances, the voting decision can never be made on 
completely rational grounds. The voter must often choose the candidate 
whose preferences he believes to conform most closely to his own.
Furthermore, a politician represents not a single public good or 
service but a large and varied package of goods and services. The 
difficulty faced by the voter of assessing the costs and benefits of a 
single public good is multiplied by the number of goods and services 
which the elected official is expected to decide upon once in office.
Finally, not all decisions faced by public officials are of the 
"more or less" variety. The task of choosing whether more or less tax 
money is to be spent on public roads or education, complicated as it may 
be, pales in comparison with the task of choosing a member of a 
legislative body who will decide that one type of behavior is criminal 
and another type is not. The first type of decision can be decided on 
the basis of anticipated costs and benefits. In the second type of 
decision, personal costs and benefits become nearly impossible to 
calculate and are often secondary to a voter's ideological preferences.
Thus the median voter model seems appropriate in cases in which the 
voter will decide on levels of public taxing and spending directly. The 
model seems entirely inappropriate for the modeling of elections for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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officials who will spend public monies on a broad variety of public 
services and also decide Issues of a more Ideological nature, such as 
criminal law. It also seems Inappropriate for the modeling of elections 
of candidates who will decide on a large number of unknown Issues.
Dennis Mueller has noted that many. If not most, empirical tests 
of the median voter model use expenditure data on local government 
expenditures determined typically by representative governments voting 
on several Issues simultaneously. Mueller points out that the median 
voter formulation has yielded quite satisfactory results In the context 
of a single Issue vote In a direct democracy. However, the researchers 
conducting such studies have, either explicitly or Implicitly, assumed 
away the theoretical points discussed above and have treated local 
public expenditures as If they contained only one characteristic and 
were decided separately. A further common assumption Is that the 
campaign positions of candidates can be taken as honest representations 
of what they will do once In o f f i c e . M u e l l e r  offers no rationale 
that would justify such a set of assumptions; he only makes them 
explicit.
A further complication results from the fact that most local 
governments engage, to some degree. In general fund budgeting. Because 
tax monies are pooled In a common fund used to finance several public 
goods and services, the taxpayer's perception of the potential costs and 
benefits of public goods Is blurred. Voters, in Mueller's words, can
^^Mueller, p. 106. Mueller's book Is Intended as a survey of the 
more significant work in the field of public choice up to the time of 
Its writing. He attempts to explain, but not justify, the work with 
which he Is familiar.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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suffer from what may be called "fiscal I l l u s i o n . A g a i n .  Mueller 
offers little hope of escape from these dilemmas.
The complications resulting from general fund budgeting carried out 
by elected representatives rather than voters themselves comprise 
significant differences between the median voter model as originally 
conceived by Bowen and the models used in much empirical testing of the 
median voter theorem. Such complications mav very well result in a 
"representative" committee elected on the basis of "fiscal Illusion"-- 
one that may be tempted and able to engage in log rolling and other 
strategic behavior. However, they also may not. It may well be that. In 
some times and places, policy outcomes are sufficiently clear cut for 
the model to be of some use to social scientists, even though some of 
the assumptions are dubious or even clearly wrong. The theoretical 
arguments that describe the possibility of blurring of the voter's 
perception of costs and benefits do not preclude the validity of testing 
the model.
^^ibid. , p. 90.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
Economists have, for a little over half a century , attempted to 
explain local government spending through statistical analysis. The 
first efforts were unguided by any identifiable behavioral theory. 
However, as work in the field proceeded, progress was made both towards 
better empirical estimation and the formulation of a guiding theory that 
would allow economists to explain government spending in terms of 
economic behavior, as well as "explain" the variation of that spending 
in a statistical sense.
As the following paragraphs will show, an income variable was 
included in public expenditure models from the very beginning, but it 
was more than twenty years before economists began to think of income's 
position in the model as being similar to that of income in a consumer's 
demand function. Income was first specified as mean rather than median 
income, and there was, at first, no attempt to identify this income 
variable with the motivations of any single voter or even a set of 
voters.
Recognition of the importance of taxes was equally slow to come.
It was more than ten years after work on such models began to appear 
that taxes, in any form, were even mentioned. Even then, a tax variable 
was passed over for consideration as an independent variable, and did 
not reappear in public expenditure formulations until twenty years after 
the first work on public expenditure analysis was done. When a tax
17
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variable finally did come into use, it was as "tax price," an element of 
a somewhat dubious demand function for the decisive voter.
Besides the demand function variables of own-price and income, 
political variables such as party competition and the size (and 
supposedly strength) of interest groups were gradually introduced into 
public expenditure models. Such "political," as opposed to "economic," 
variables were intended to make the dels sophisticated enough to 
capture the expenditure variation which results from a complex budgeting 
process.
UNGUIDED EMPIRICISM
One of the earliest notable attempts at statistical analysis of 
public expenditures was published in 1952.^^ Solomon Fabricant 
explored interstate differences in public expenditures using Census 
data from 1942. Because of the varying responsibilities of different 
levels of government, state and local expenditures were aggregated 
within each state.
Fabricant posited expenditures per capita as a function of average 
per capita income, the state's degree of urbanization, and its 
population density. Using ordinary least squares (OLS), he "explained" 
72 percent of the interstate variation in total expenditures per 
capita. He also determined that mean income was statistically the most 
important of his explanatory variables, with density being somewhat less
"Solomon Fabricant, The Trend of Government Activity in the U.S 
Since 1900 (New York; National Bureau of Economic Research, 1952).
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significant (both statistically and. in his judgement, theoretically), 
and urbanization having only a small positive but statistically 
insignificant effect on the dependent variable.
In fact, Fabricant remarked that "there is a question whether 
anything is gained by including urbanization."^^ Although the author 
emphasized the need for further research to analyze that portion of 
expenditures per capita as yet "unexplained," he seemed quite pleased 
with his model, choice of variables, and results. He wrote, "in the 
variables selected we have the manor factors, or representatives of 
them, involved in interstate differences in government activity. 
(emphasis added)
The simplicity of Fabricant's formulation shows how far removed 
his model was from a true demand function. Income was included as an 
explanatory variable, but his article showed no theoretical basis for 
using this variable in the way it might be used in a demand function, 
i.e. as a measure of the voter's ability to pay for goods and services 
received. Another difference between Fabricant's formulation and the 
median voter approach is that he chose to use mean income in each state 
rather than median income, which is identified in the modern theory as 
the Income of the decisive voter. Of course, mean income could be 
identified with a single voter just as easily as the median value, but 
Fabricant made no such argument. His model was also devoid of the price 
variables one would expect to see in a demand function. The prices of
Ibid. , p. 122. 
^^Ibid. , p . 123 .
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complements and substitutes are normally thought to be an important part 
of demand as well. In the case of public expenditure analysis, these 
prices would be the prices of private goods and services. While never 
intending to formulate a demand function, Fabricant mentioned, but 
^^fbually explained away, the effect of the prices of private goods and 
services: Interstate variations in price were too small to warrant their 
specific inclusion in the model. Furthermore, Fabricant stated, . .our 
measure of income indicates differences in real per capita income plus 
price differences."^®
The author's purpose was statistical estimation, not theoretical 
explanation of expenditures per capita, and apparently the collinearity 
of prices and incomes was judged sufficient to make his model work. The 
independent variable's own-price, its tax price, was nowhere to be 
found. In fact. Fabricant made only one fleeting reference to taxes; he 
noted that increases in real income would increase both the quantity of 
public goods and services demanded and the tax capacity basic to their 
supply.
Finally, economists conceptualize demand for a good or service as 
being dependent on the individual's tastes and preferences.
Fabricant's urbanization and population density variables can indeed be 
thought of as indicators of the preference for public goods and 
services. However, they are not particularly good indicators (at least, 
they were not in his specification). The coefficient for population 
density was statistically significant for only five of ten functional
^®Ibid. , p. 128
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categories of government spending. The urbanization coefficient was 
statistically significant for only four of these functional categories 
and insignificant in "explaining" total expenditures per capita. 
Fabricant himself pointed out that other measures, such as 
industrialization, might have been used, but made no attempt to make use 
of such variables.
Despite these differences between Fabricant's formulation and a 
median voter demand function, it should not be inferred that Fabricant 
was a poor social scientist. Far from it. Fabricant not only 
identified income (even if it was in somewhat different form) as the 
major explanatory variable, he also was a pioneer in applying OLS to 
the analysis of public expenditures.
These days it may seem quite natural that an economist could 
conceive of expenditures for goods or services, public or private, in 
terms of demand for that good or service, (at least, many economists do 
so, even though their conceptual models are often criticized for 
oversimplification and excessive assumptions.) However, in the case of 
public goods and services. Fabricant can not be blamed for not seeing 
this. In 1952, pubic choice theory was still in its infancy. It is 
true that the first theoretical steps towards a theory of voter-guided 
resource allocation had been made eight years previously, but there is 
no reason to believe that Fabricant knew of even these beginnings. For 
economists, the theory of demand is founded on individual behavior. In 
a sense, it would have been premature of Fabricant to posit a proper 
demand function with incomes, prices, and tastes and preferences without 
reference to a theory which described the behavior of the individual
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doing the demanding. In any case, he certainly can not be faulted for 
falling to develop the theory of the median voter on his own.
In 1961, Glenn Fisher applied Fabricant's model to data extracted 
from the 1957 Census of Governments. He noted the "widely recognized" 
Influence of differences in per capita Income on variations in public 
spending and added that differences In population density and 
urbanization were somewhat less Important but were still "often 
recognized as being factors which should be c o n s i d e r e d . F i s h e r ' s  
model "explained" only 53 percent of the variation In total per capita 
expenditures, considerably less that Fabricant's seventy two percent. 
Consequently, he suggested that historians, political scientists, or 
legal scholars familiar with the geographic region for which his model's 
predictions were amiss would be able to help explain some of the 
variation that statistical analysis was unable to "explain" 
statistically. For the most part, the estimated coefficients conformed 
in sign and size to Fisher's expectations. For the 11 functional 
expenditure categories explored, he found 8 negative coefficients for 
the population density variable. Of the equations for spending In 
functior.- areas, 7 yielded positive coefficients for the urbanization 
variable, and 9 yielded positive coefficients for per capita Income. 
Again, the Income variable was much more statistically significant than 
the other two Independent variables.
Because his model "explained" less variation than Fabricant's, 
Fisher was apparently somewhat discouraged. He wrote
^^Glenn W. Fisher, "Determinants of State and Local Government 
Expenditures: A Preliminary Analysis," National Tax Journal 24 (December 
1961) 349.
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These coefficients are high enough to Indicate that multiple 
regression analysis has made a substantial contribution to 
explaining expenditure variation. They are also low enough to 
leave room for much further work.
Fisher closed by suggesting two possible additional independent 
variables; percentage of students attending private colleges (for 
estimating higher education expenditures) and percentage of students 
attending parochial schools (for estimating expenditures on local 
schools). He noted that the Income, population density, and urbanization 
variables used yielded mixed results In the statistical estimation of 
expenditures, depending on the functional category estimated.
Variations "unexplained" by his model offered, he felt, "a fertile field 
for further study, using either quantitative or non-quantltatlve 
methods.
In 1963, Ernest Kurnow published the results of a revised model 
tested on the same Census data used by Fisher. Kurnow first changed the 
Fabricant-Fisher additive model to a "joint regression model", I.e. a 
model In which all variables. Independent and dependent, are transformed 
by taking their natural logarithms. Such a transformation is Intended 
to account for any Interactions, or joint effects, of the Independent 
variables on the dependent variable. Using the same 3 Independent 
variables as Fabricant and Fisher had used, Kurnow "explained" 88 
percent of the variation In the 1942 expenditure data and 78 percent of 
the variation In the 1957 figures.
^®Ibid. , p. 352. 
^"Ibld. . p. 355.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 4
Confident that his joint regression model represented a significant 
improvement over the mathematical form of the Fabricant-Fisher linear 
model, Kurnow then began making adjustments to the list of independent 
variables. He noted the increased reliance of state and local 
governments in the post-war period on federal grants - in-aid and thus 
decided to add federal aid per capita as an explanatory variable.
Kurnow also added the student-teacher ratio in elementary schools as a
proxy for the quality of public services. Finally, the population 
density variable was deleted from the model because it was found to be
highly correlated with urbanization but not as good a predictor
variable. Kurnow's joint regression model, with four independent 
variables, "explained" 81 percent of the variation in the 1957 
expenditure figures. He thus felt he had demonstrated the importance of 
the proper choice of mathematical form and independent variables in 
estimating government expenditures.
It should be pointed out, though, that this model has been 
criticized. Elliot Morss has objected to the inclusion of federal aid 
as an explanatory variable. Because virtually all federal aid must be 
spent by recipient governments, the statistical significance of the 
coefficient for aid was unsurprising and almost vacuous. According to 
Morss,
...little is to be gained from simply regressing the dependent 
variable on itself or parts of itself....using aid to explain 
expenditures is analogous to using taxes to explain expenditures 
in the sense that both aid and taxes are sources of funds. The 
fact that these variables turn out to have substantial 
explanatory power serves as little more than verification of the
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quite obvious fact that government receipts and expenditures are 
closely related.
In light of the Importance of tax price in the median voter's 
demand function, it is quite ironic that Morss would refer to the 
possibility of using taxes as an independent variable in such a 
disparaging way--statistically significant but uninteresting. Of 
course, the point he was making was correct. Public expenditure 
analysis was taking a turn toward mindless number crunching, in which 
the only goal seemed to be to increase the predictive value of the 
models.
Morss can hardly be credited with hitting on the appropriate price 
variable (or any price variable, for that matter), but he correctly 
criticized the field's current lack of direction. His major concern was 
that recent studies in public expenditure analysis were geared too much 
toward increasing a model's "goodness of fit" and paid too little 
attention to finding a behaviorally based explanation of public 
expenditures. A model geared toward this latter purpose would be of 
much more practical use to economists trying to understand government 
finances and government officials trying to estimate revenue needs.
In 1964, Seymore Sacks and Robert Harris used Fabricant's "three 
basic factors," per capita income, population density, and 
urbanization, to "explain" 53 percent of the variation in state and
^°Elliot R. Morss, "Some Thoughts on the Determinants of State and 
Local Expenditures," National Tax Journal 29 (March 1966): 97,
21Ibid.
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local expenditure figures from 1 9 6 0 . The amount of variation 
"explained" was almost precisely the amount "explained" by Fisher, but 
far below the amount "explained" by Fabricant. Again, Sacks and Harris 
focused on state and local governments' increased reliance on 
intergovernmental transfers to explain the increasingly poor performance 
of the "three basic factors" model. For this reason, they felt 
justified in adding federal and state transfer payments to the list of 
explanatory variables. According to the authors, "federal aid can be 
regarded as 'outside money' from the point of view of the state and 
local government, and its availability should be expected to have a 
direct impact on raising state and local expenditure levels.
State aid to local governments was a slightly different matter. 
Because state aid is financed partially by internally raised taxes, its 
effect on expenditures would be ambiguous. Thus, the authors expected a 
positive coefficient for the federal aid variable but had no 
theoretically based expectations for the coefficient of the state aid 
variable.
Sacks and Harris' 5-variable model "explained" 87 percent of the 
variation in per capita spending. The inclusion of federal aid in the 
model was found to be particularly helpful for the estimation of two 
functional expenditure categories, highways and public welfare, two
^^Seymore Sacks and Robert Harris, "The Determinants of State and 
Local Government Expenditures and Intergovernmental Flow of Funds," 
National Tax
Journal 27 (March 1964): 75.
z^Ibid.
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programs in which the federal government had taken an increasingly large 
role.
The authors ended by endorsing three of the independent variables 
in their model.
The emerging picture shows the dominant role of the two aid 
variables and personal income in both total expenditures and in 
the dollarwise most important categories. Only in the case of 
the smaller and definitely locally financed functions are 
population density and percent urban statistically significant.
Given federal and state aid, the income variable is 
statistically significant and positive in every case.^^
They also emphasized the importance of government's means of financing
to its level of spending. "In effect, it is impossible to explain the
fiscal activities of a state-local government without reference to the
other elements of the overall governmental system of which they are
component parts.
FOCUS ON PERSONAL INCOME AND TAXES
Fisher published another study in 1954 which, in its final form,
included seven of twelve variables considered. Two variables
considered are of particular note. Fisher considered, but ultimately
did not include in his model, median family income. Without reference
to any theory of the median voter, he reasoned
the existence of a few very high income persons in a state would 
substantially raise the per capita income figure but would have 
little effect upon the median income. These high incomes, of 
course, represent taxpaying ability and, to the extent that the
2^Ibid. , p. 82. 
^^Ibid. , p . 85 .
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tax system of the state is able to tap that income, may affect
the level of government expenditure.^®
Thus, Fisher had considered precisely the measure of income used in 
median voter public expenditure demand functions, but had done so merely 
to attain a model that might "fit" the data better. It is also 
encouraging that he mentioned the ability of voters to pay taxes. 
However, as mentioned above, he ultimately eliminated this variable from 
the model. He did, however, include a measure of income distribution 
as an explanatory variable. His theoretically based expectations for 
the coefficient of the percent of families earning under $2,000 were 
ambiguous. Fisher reasoned "...the existence of a large number of low 
income persons would generally exert downward pressure on government 
expenditure, but, at the same time would result in greater 'need' for 
certain specific expenditures such as public w e l f a r e . L o w  income 
people were thought to feel the bite of the relatively regressive state 
and local tax structures more than the affluent. Thus, there would be
greater political resistance to higher taxes among this group of voters.
In light of the previous absence of a price or price-like variable, 
it is even more encouraging that Fisher did include a tax-related 
variable, the per capita yield of a representative property tax, which 
is "... an estimate of the amount of revenue which would be produced if 
each state levied a representative tax upon property assessed at a
^®Glen W. Fisher, "Interstate Variation in State and Local 
Government Expenditure," National Tax Journal 27 (March 1964); 61
Ibid.
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uniform percentage of true value. 8̂ Fisher evidently was thinking of 
the voter's ability to pay and the government's ability to raise money, 
but he still had not come to the point of conceiving government spending 
as a response to the voters' wishes. Indeed, the tax measure used by 
Fisher measured the voters' ability to pay, but not the price they 
actually were required to pay, a very important feature of an economic 
demand function.
In addition to these 2 "economic" variables, 3 "demographic" 
variables, and 2 "socio-political" variables were included as 
explanatory variables. The "demographic" variables--population density, 
percent urban, and percent increase in population over the previous 
decade--as well as the "socio-political" variables--a measure of two 
party competition, and percent of the population over 25 with fewer than 
5 years of schooling--turned out to be statistically insignificant in 
estimating the total expenditures per capita. These latter five 
variables were also only fair to poor predictors In the estimations for
the functional categories. Thus, the "economic" variables dominated the
model statistically.
Finally, Fisher had "serious doubts about the validity of using 
federal aid as an Independent variable" in a multiple regression model 
of public expenditures.29 Although a federal aid variable considerably 
Increased the amount of variation "explained" In earlier models, he
considered the "feedback effect" of federal aid on expenditures per
28ibid. , p.p. 61-2 . 
29lbld. , p - 72 .
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capita too large for a valid specification. Thus, Fisher discarded the 
aid variable.
A 1965 study by Roy Bahl and Robert Saunders added what they saw 
a further methodological refinement to public expenditure analysis. 
Rather than estimate absolute levels of spending per capita, the authors 
proposed estimating the changes in spending per capita as a function of 
the changes in the independent variables. Theoretically, this 
represented substantial progress, according to Bahl and Saunders. In a 
sense, it definitely did represent theoretical progress. It indicated 
that Bahl and Saunders were thinking in terms of voters' and 
governments' response to past conditions.
The results of the empirical test of the authors' model, however, 
were not so impressive. Using Census data for the years 1957 and 1960, 
the authors found that change in per capita federal grants to states was 
the only statistically significant variable in a model containing other 
independent variables.
Bahl and Saunders then tested their model on a subsample of states. 
They reasoned that "a breakdown into a smaller group of states having 
certain homogeneous traits may increase the proportion of variation of 
expenditures which can be explained. The traits chosen for study 
were population density and per capita income. A group of 15 states 
with densities over 65 persons per square mile and per capita incomes
30&oy W. Bahl and Robert J. Saunders, "Determinants of Changes in 
State and Local Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal 28 
(March, 1965): 50-7.
3ilbid. , p. 55 .
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over $2,000 was selected. Because only high income-high density states 
were included in the subsample, the model partially controlled for these 
variables. (It should be noted, however, that specific inclusion of 
income and density as independent variables would have controlled for 
these variables far more precisely.)
The 5-variable model "explained" less of the variation in change in 
total spending for the 15 selected states than for the 48 states, but 
the subsample estimation was more successful in "explaining" the 
variations in spending change broken down by function. The influence of 
federal grants was substantially reduced in the high income-high density 
group, indicating that federal aid is a less powerful predictor for 
spending changes in jurisdictions characterized by such traits. In 
other words, more affluent jurisdictions seemed to establish their own 
preference for public goods with less regard to federal largesse than 
did poorer jurisdictions.
Despite the fact that Bahl and Saunders "explained" only 31 percent 
of the variation of the expenditure change--and this only for a 15- 
state subsample--they felt their model was successful. Previous models 
had "explained" levels of spending, not changes in spending, and thus 
were not strictly comparable. Non-longitudinal cross-sectional studies 
simply did not address the practical problems of state and local 
government planning. Thus, the authors felt they had suggested a 
fruitful area for further research for economists and other social 
scientists.
A 1966 study by James Barr and Otto Davis added little to the body 
of empirical work in government expenditure analysis, but laid much of
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the theoretical groundwork to be used l a t e r .  garr and Davis presented 
logical and mathematical arguments that voters could and inoeed did 
attempt to maximize their personal utilities--subject to their incomes, 
the prices of private goods and services, and the prices of public goods 
and services--through the votes they cast. Thus the authors explicitly 
recognized that public goods and services, as well as the "prices" paid 
for them, entered into the calculation of one's utility. In this 
formulation, public goods and services were figured in to the utility 
function in much the same way as private goods and services. There was 
also an argument that politicians sought to remain in office and a 
mathematical proof which, the authors asserted, demonstrated that the 
surest way to do so was to appeal to the preferences of the median 
voter.
Income and price appeared in the model and they considered it a 
true demand function, although it was based on admittedly simplistic 
assumptions concerning the political process of budgeting. However, the 
model was not yet ready for testing, according to the authors; they felt 
it untestable because the median voter's preferences were unobservable 
and the median voter in different jurisdictions would have different 
incomes as well as differing tastes and preferences. (Barr and Davis 
did not go so far as to identify the voter at the political median with 
the voter at the economic median.)
32james L. Barr and Otto A. Davis, "An Elementary Political and 
Economic Theory of the Expenditures of Local Governments," Southern 
Economic Journal 33 (October 1966): 149-65.
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A simplified version of the model was tested for Pennsylvania 
counties, but with only countywlde taxable value and the ratio of owner- 
occupied homes to registered voters as Independent variables, the 
results were of little practical use. The estimated coefficients were 
of the correct sign and usually statistically significant, but only a 
small portion of the variation of the expenditure variable was 
statistically "explained." Curiously, the addition of income as an 
explanatory variable did not improve the explanatory power of the model.
In 1967 Ira Sharkansky, a political scientist, estimated government 
expenditure with a model that accounted for the spending of previous 
years. He thus acknowledged that government budgets are often 
established through what is known as an "Incremental" process.
Sharkansky's dependent variable was state expenditures per capita (for 
1963), not aggregated state and local spending. His Independent 
variables were per capita personal income, federal aid as a proportion 
of state government revenue, state and local taxes as a proportion of 
personal Income (Sharkansky's measure of "tax effort"), the proportion 
of state and local spending done by states, and previous state 
expenditures.
Personal Income had a role In public expenditure models since the 
time of Fabricant's formulation, but Its place In the model had never 
been given a theoretical justification. Sharkansky specifically 
included his Income variable because he felt it to be a measure of 
"economic development." Thus, Sharkansky's behavioral justification for 
including an income measure was not the same as the justification given 
it by proponents of the median voter model. Despite this difference in
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behavioral approaches, the use of a measure of tax effort represented a 
significant theoretical step. Tax effort was included because "...it 
measures the level of economic support given to state and local 
governments by citizens, and thereby stands as an indicator of popular 
support for government services."”  Surprisingly, though, the 
coefficient for tax effort was not statistically significant in the 
estimation of total spending or spending in any functional category.
The use of previous expenditures as a predictive variable says more 
than simply that the future will be similar to the past. Political 
scientists have long thought of government budgeting as incremental. 
Apart from the Influence of "force of habit," the level of previous 
spending
...may work its influence through the formal process of 
budgeting and appropriations.... the techniques of incremental 
budgeting place great weight on previous expenditures in the 
determination of current expenditures.... The (expenditure) base 
serves as the starting point for calculations among those who 
ask for funds, and the base serves as the portion of a request 
that is most likely to be considered legitimate by those who 
review appropriations.^"
Furthermore, as Robert Harlow has pointed out, last year's expenditures 
can be thought of as a proxy for the combined effect of all the 
political forces, formal and informal, which enter into the budgetary 
process, as well as economic and demographic conditions.
33%ra Sharkansky, "Some More Thoughts About the Determinants of 
Government Expenditures," National Tax Journal 30 (June, 1967); 171.
34ibid.
^^Robert L. Harlow, "Sharkansky on State Expenditures: A Comment," 
31 National Tax Journal 31 (June, 1968) p. 215.
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The coefficient of the previous expenditure variable in 
Sharkansky's study was positive and quite significant for all spending 
categories estimated. However, this variable is of limited practical 
use since it represents the compounded effect of several separate 
forces. In fact, previous expenditures seems to be too powerful a 
predictor; when it is included in a multiple regression model, variables 
that were previously statistically significant and theoretically 
important, such as income, become statistically insignificant.
In 1968, David Smith published the results of a 50-state 
cross-sectional expenditure analysis based on a "political approach to 
tax and expenditure decision making."^® Smith's model was based on many 
of the elements of public choice theory. 7 r instance, he worked from 
the assumption that elected officials seek to maximize the probability 
of their re-election, i.e. they attempt to maximize their votes. 
Furthermore, he assumed that individuals had different "demands" for 
public goods and services and were able to make these demands known 
through the election of public officials.
Smith's unit of analysis, however, was the governmental unit, 
specifically the governmental unit receiving a federal grant-in-aid, and 
not the individual taxpayer-voter. Consequently, he recognized the 
disutility associated with the taxes needed to support public 
expenditures. However, this disutility was that faced by the legislator 
voting to levy the tax.
^®David L. Smith, "The Response of State and Local Governments to 
Federal Grants," 31 National Tax Journal 31 (September 1968) 350.
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Smith's analysis did contain a price variable, of sorts, but not 
the tax price of recent public expenditure analysis. His major concern 
was the expenditure response of recipient governments; he maintained 
that "the basic feature of a conditional matching grant is that it has 
the effect of reducing the price of a specific governmental service to a 
lower-level government". Because public goods and services were 
generally not produced in physical units that were "sold" to the public, 
it was impossible to quantify either a unit or a price for them.
However, Smith assumed the recipient government's expenditure response 
to a federal grant was analogous to a price elasticity of demand for the 
aided function and the "grant elasticity of expenditure" yielded a proxy 
price faced by the recipient. Using a log-linear multiple regression 
model. Smith estimated per capita state and local government 
expenditures as a function of five independent variables, all of which, 
except percent of population 65 or over, have been discussed in 
reference to earlier studies. He "explained" 79 percent of the 
variation in the general expenditures.
Because the focus of Smith's study was the behavioral effect of 
grants on governments, not voters, his conclusions are of limited value 
in constructing a demand function that describes the median voter's 
preference for public goods. The reasoning used to build the model, 
however, bears a striking resemblance to that used in modern public 
choice-median voter models.
3?rbid., p. 351
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A PROPOSAL FOR A TRUE DEMAND FUNCTION
In 1973, Theodore Bergstrom and Robert Goodman published an attempt
to "develop a method for estimating demand functions of individuals for
municipal public services."^® The model was based on the theory that 
demand will depend on the traditional variables, price and income. as 
well as on certain demographic characteristics of the individual and 
the city in which he lives'*.®^ (emphasis added)
The authors listed a set of assumptions on which their model was 
based. They can be summarized as the following
1) The production of public goods and services is a constant 
cost industry.
2) Every consumer of public goods pays a tax share. a fraction 
of the total cost of public expenditures in the community.
This tax share may be based on the consumer's wealth, his
or her income, or other individual characteristics, but it
does not vary with public expenditures or the way in which 
the desire for public goods and services is expressed.
3) Every consumer of public goods and services has a tax price, 
the product of his tax share and the total cost of the public 
goods and services in question, and is able to determine the 
quantity of the public commodity which he would choose for the 
community given that he must pay his share of the cost. To
do this he needs to maximize his own utility subject to a 
budget constraint containing this tax price.
4) In each jurisdiction, the quantity supplied of the public 
good or service in question is equal to the median of the 
quantities demanded by its citizens. In other words, the 
government responds to the median set of quantity preferences 
in its supply of public goods and services.
®®Theodore C. Bergstrom and Robert P. Goodman, "Private Demand for 
Public Goods," American Economic Review 63 (June 1973): 280.
®^Ibid.
40lbid., p.p. 280-1.
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5) In each jurisdiction, the median of the quantities demanded
is the quantity demanded by the citizen with the median i n c o m e  
in that jurisdiction.
Assumptions four and five allow one to view the quantity of public goods
chosen by the jurisdiction through the political process as the amount
that is desired by the consumer with the median income. Assumptions one
and two allow public expenditures to be treated as observations (of the
quantity demanded) on the demand curve of a consumer of public goods who
has the median income in his community. The own-price of those public
goods is proportional to the tax share (assumption three).
All together, the assumptions posit public expenditures as a 
function of the "traditional economic variables, price and income." 
Bergstrom and Goodman noted that the first four of these assumptions had 
been proposed and studied by Howard Bowen in 1 9 4 3 . and again by James 
Barr and Otto Davis in 1966. Additional assumptions, which seem even 
more questionable, are that the prices of private goods and the unit 
costs of public goods are the same in each jurisdiction observed.
The only one of their variables which Bergstrom and Goodman felt 
needed explanation was tax share (which, again, is proportional to tax 
price). In order to have a true demand function, the voter-consumer 
must be thought to respond to a perceived price for public goods.
'•^Howard H. Bowen, "The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation 
of Economic Resources," Quarterly Journal of Economics 53 (November 
1943): 27-48. Bowen attempted to delineate the conditions under which 
democratic voting might produce "the ideal output of a social good," 
Modern public choice-median voter theory does not require this social 
optimum. Indeed, it generally will not be attained, according to the 
modern theory. However, Bowen's work did outline underlying assumptions 
still used today.
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While most people do not know their tax share, most have a pretty good
idea of the total tax bill they receive every year.
If one were to ask several individuals what their tax shares 
are, we suspect that few would be able to answer the question 
sensibly without more reflection than usually takes place before 
voting. Nevertheless, they may have knowledge which is for our 
purposes equivalent. For example, if a citizen knows his 
municipal tax bill and believes that his taxes will change in 
proportion to municipal expenditures, he will know the cost to 
him of a given percentage change in municipal expenditures.'’’
Bergstrom and Goodman tested their theoretical model by estimating, 
with a log-linear regression model, three functional expenditures for 
826 medium-sized American cities. They were pleased to discover that 
their estimates of income elasticities were usually positive and 
statistically significant and estimates of price elasticity usually 
negative and significant. In no case were any estimated elasticities of 
the theoretically incorrect sign and statistically significant. Thus, 
the "traditional" variables of income and price appeared to be acting in 
the model as economic theory would predict. The estimated elasticity 
for population was everywhere positive and almost always statistically 
significant. The coefficient for percent population change was 
virtually everywhere negative and statistically significant about half 
of the time. The authors explained this response to population change 
as a failure to achieve "political equilibrium".*^ Time is required for 
a rapidly growing or declining city to adjust its level of expenditures, 
and such cities apparently were not adjusting their expenditures as 
rapidly as their populations might warrant.
*^Bergstrom and Goodman, p. 284. 
*3lbid., p. 290.
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Six other Independent variables were used in the Bergstrora-Goodman 
model. One of those is of particular relevance to a the present study, 
which attempts to examine the effect of economic growth on public 
expenditures. The ratio of employment to residential property owners 
was used as an indicator of a community's commercial or industrial 
activity. Bergstrom and Goodman hypothesized that larger amounts of 
public goods and services must be provided by a local government in 
order to attract and retain such activity. This hypothesized 
relationship was apparently borne out by the estimates; the estimated 
elasticity for this variable was usually positive, and always positive 
wherever statistically significant.
Douglas Booth's 1978 article about the simultaneous effects of 
economic growth on public expenditures and the tax base is particularly 
germane to any investigation of the fiscal impacts of economic growth. 
Booth's study was designed to explore the relationship between a city's 
employment base and its fiscal health. His model was based on the 
insight that two kinds of economic change, growth or decline in either 
manufacturing or mercantile activity, affect both the desire and need 
for public services and the local government's means for paying for such 
services. (Booth used per capita employment to represent commercial and 
industrial activity: manufacturing activity was represented by 
manufacturing employment and mercantile activity by employment in 
services and wholesale and retail trade.) Thus, he estimated two 
functions--one to "explain" public expenditures and one to "explain" the 
tax price faced by voters.
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Although he recognized the roles of politicians and voters, as
outlined previously, in the process of determining public spending,
Booth felt the median voter model somewhat unrealistic because it failed
to include the influence of interest groups. Because each citizen's
vote is only one among several, he has little reason to spend a great
deal of time and energy becoming informed about political and
governmental matters; he remains "rationally ignorant" on many issues
and is easily influenced by political information received, at no cost,
from politicians or special interest groups. Booth also recognized the
importance of the economic role of local government and felt that this
role should be accounted for in the expenditure model.
The ability of the municipal politician to retain political 
office hinges in large measure on the smooth functioning of 
local economic institutions. This requires that municipal 
services be kept within certain bounds. On the one hand, the 
consequence of Inadequate levels of municipal expenditures and 
services would be significant damage to the local economic base 
from such problems as high crime rates, traffic congestion, high 
incidence of property damage from fires, and a poorly educated 
population. On the other hand, if municipal expenditures are 
excessive, municipal taxes would become so burdensome on 
household budgets as to impinge on consumption of private 
commodities necessary to an orderly functioning of economic 
life. Excessive taxes could also impinge on business profits 
in a municipality, disrupting the accumulation of business 
wealth and curtailing local employment.'*'' (emphasis added)
Individual voters will generally be much more aware of their tax bills
and public expenditures than they will be about the full array of
public goods and services. On the other hand, organized interests will
have their own particular objectives and will take pains to become
'•"Douglas E. Booth, "The Differential Impact of Manufacturing and 
Mercantile Activity on Local Government Expenditures and Revenues," 
National Tax Journal 32 (March 1978): 34.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4 2
informed of the benefits (to themselves) of public goods and services. 
According to such reasoning, any model that fails to Include interest 
groups will be greatly misspecified; voters, who will tend to want to 
hold the line on taxes and expenditures, should be balanced in the model 
by interest groups, such as downtown merchants associations, public 
employee unions, and neighborhood organizations, whose members will 
lobby for specific public goods and services.
Booth's empirical model of public spending included only six 
independent variables. He used population and population density as 
"environmental variables" which acted as "constraints on the municipal 
service production process in service supply d e c i s i o n s . B o o t h  felt 
it likely that the per capita cost schedule for a particular service 
with respect to population was U-shaped, implying that the costs of 
providing services, and the expenditures necessitated by those costs, 
varied with population and eventually reached a turning point at which 
diseconomies of size began to predominate. Because congestion problems 
appear and begin to increase at some point, population density was felt 
to have a conceptually similar impact on costs. Thus, the sign on these 
coefficients could not be predicted a priori.
Booth's insights into the politics of government spending, as well 
as the production realities of the public sector, led him to include 
both manufacturing and mercantile employment per capita as independent 
variables in his expenditure regression. They served as measures of the 
level of business activity and consequent demand for business-related
45lbid.
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services. They also served as a proxy for the political clout of the 
business community.
The "economic" variables of income and tax share were also 
included, although it should be noted that their specifications were not 
the same as those found in models like the Bergstrom and Goodman model. 
Although Booth was quite aware of the theory that politicians respond to 
the demands of the median voter, he used mean rather than median family 
income in his model. He "Iso used the ratio of residential assessed 
value to total assessed value as his measure of tax share, thus 
specifying a variable proportional to the mean rather than median tax 
price.
Booth's linear regression model tested a cross section of 47 medium 
to large Wisconsin cities using 1970 data. The results gave only 
limited confirmation of the theoretical assumptions used. The
coefficients for the mercantile employment variable were positive, as
expected, and statistically significant for all three functional areas 
examined--police, fire, and school expenditures. The coefficients for 
the manufacturing variable, surprisingly, were in all cases positive, 
but statistically significant only in the regression for police 
expenditures.
Coefficients for the income variable were all positive, but 
significant only for estimating police and school spending. The
coefficients for tax share were negative--seeming to affirm the negative
relationship of price and quantity which economists usually expect--and 
statistically significant for spending on fire protection and school 
spending. They were positive and insignificant for spending on police
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protection. The model "explained" only 47, 57, and 67 percent of the 
variation in fire, police, and school spending respectively.
The second regression in the model had the tax price (technically, 
the tax share) as a function of two previously used variables, 
manufacturing and mercantile employment per capita. Both employment 
elasticities were negative and statistically significant, and 57 
percent of the variation in tax price was "explained" by the model.
Feeling that his two regressions adequately reflected the 
determination of public spending and tax price. Booth used the estimated 
elasticities to compute the changes in residential tax bills and public 
spending that would accompany employment growth. He reasoned that the 
impact of an added employee on the residential tax bill could be 
expressed as
e , a t / + t(6e,/8n, + d e j d t  ■ 8t/anJ
where is the expenditure for function 1, and nj is the ratio of 
manufacturing employment to population for j = manufacturing and the 
ratio of mercantile employment to population for j = mercantile. The 
residential share of taxes required for financing municipal services is 
represented as t. The first component of the expression is the change 
in the residential tax bill that results from the change in the 
residential tax share. The second component is the change in the 
residential tax bill that results from a change in the expenditure per 
capita. Changes in public expenditures as employment grows or declines 
can be represented with the following expression:
dejBt ■ dt/dn̂ .
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Booth calculated the tax price and expenditure effects of 
employment change based on the above expressions and the average values 
of expenditures and tax share for the sample. He concluded that, if 
political and tax base mobility effects were small enough to be ignored, 
manufacturing activity had a beneficial impact on local government, 
reducing taxes while increasing expenditures on local residents. 
Mercantile activity, though, had a harmful fiscal impact, causing taxes 
to increase by a greater proportion than the increase in expenditures on 
services.
Of course. Booth realized that the effects of politics and tax base 
mobility could not be ignored in the real world, and thus considered his 
conclusions quite tentative. Yet he felt that If his results were 
replicated In other studies his model could very well be used to 
describe the fiscal plight of many older cities.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE STATISTICAL MODEL
LESSONS FROM PAST STUDIES
The successes and failures of past empirical work on the estimation 
public expenditures, outlined in the previous chapter, provide many 
lessons useful in the construction of a model intended to explore the 
effects of economic growth on local government spending. This chapter 
will describe such a model developed with these lessons in mind. As in 
âll of the previous work mentioned, ordinary least squares will be used 
to statistically estimate the effects of a set of independent variables 
on a set of measures of government spending. Cross-sectional analysis 
of expenditures will be performed on expenditure figures for 54 of the 
56 county governments in Montana.
Previous studies often analyzed state and local expenditures 
aggregated together. This was necessary for nation-wide studies, 
because of the difficulty of distinguishing between State and local 
responsibilities in the various states. This aggregation problem can be 
overcome by focusing the analysis on the expenditures of Montana county 
governments alone, since counties in Montana have similar 
responsibilities for providing public goods and services and are bound 
by similar State laws.
Such a focus has an important additional advantage. To the degree 
that the voter/consumer determines public expenditures, aggregation of
46
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state and local expenditures only compounds the problems of estimation. 
The voter/consumers of the various States are far more likely to have 
dissimilar tastes and preferences than those of the a single State. 
Statistical analysis of government expenditures in the single state is 
less likely to be complicated by unknown and unmeasured differences in 
taxpayer preferences; Montanans are simply more likely to be homogeneous 
in their preferences than are Americans as a whole.
Also, as in previous studies of this nature, equations accounting 
for general expenditures, as well as expenditures in several functional 
areas, will be estimated. For reasons to be explained below, some of 
the variables will not be used to measure expenditures in the functional 
areas.
Because there is no theoretical guide as to the correct 
mathematical form of the equation, two common forms, the linear and log- 
linear, will be estimated and reported. The linear function will be 
more appropriate if the independent variables are thought to affect the 
dependent in an additive way. The log-linear form will be useful in the 
interpretation of any joint effects of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable.
THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES
The dependent variables used will be various measures of aggregate 
county expenditures for fiscal year 1981-82. This means there will be a 
lag of approximately nine months between the observation times of my 
dependent and major independent variables. Some lag time, however.
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seems appropriate to allow time for voters to react to changing economic 
conditions, and the timing of the Census Bureau's collection of data 
makes these dates most convenient. Because the goods in question are 
public goods and are characterized, to some degree, by jointness in both 
consumption and production, it is quite possible that aggregate 
expenditures rather than expenditures per capita is the more appropriate 
form of the dependent variable. The appropriate proxy for the quantity 
of public goods demanded will be expenditures per capita if the median 
voter perceives the utility of each unit of the public good provided as 
being diminished by the use of other citizens. If the median voter 
perceives no such crowding effect, the more appropriate proxy for 
quantity is aggregate expenditures. Of course, there are very few pure 
public goods, and the public goods provided by county governments, such 
as roads and police and firm protection, are especially prone to the 
effects of crowding at some point. Economic theory is not decisive 
here. Whether the expenditures of county governments are more 
appropriately modeled as aggregate expenditures or expenditures per 
capital is an empirical question. The answer to this question is 
probably not the same for all county expenditures in all places and 
times.
In order to help resolve this matter, a data set for fiscal 1971-72 
was constructed, using the same variables as in the data set for the 
1980's. This data set was used to estimate, for purposes of comparison, 
both aggregate general expenditures and expenditures per capita. The 
model for aggregate expenditures provided a better statistical "fit" to 
the data than did the expenditures per capita model. The model using
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expenditures per capita yielded an of 0.70, Indicating that 70 
percent of the variation in expenditures per capita were "explained" by 
the model. An indicator of the model's overall explanatory ability, the 
F statistic, was 8.03; However, the model for aggregate expenditures 
"explained" about 85 percent of the variation of the dependent variable; 
the value of for this equation was 0.85 and that of the F statistic 
was 19.06. Because of the statistical superiority of the aggregate 
expenditures formulation, it was decided to use aggregate expenditure 
measures in the 1980's models of both general and functional 
expenditures.
The authors of past studies of a similar nature have used 
expenditures per capita as the dependent variable, so it was somewhat 
surprising to find that such a large improvement in the model's 
statistical "fit" could be made by departing from the usual form. 
Furthermore, this departure means the results from this study will not 
be entirely comparable to past work in the area. Yet such a departure 
seems justified; the improvement in statistical estimates is very likely 
an indicator that public goods and services provided by Montana 
counties, and perhaps by other local governments, are more public, i.e. 
less subject to crowding effects, than was previously implied by the 
expenditures per capita formulation. This could be because previous 
researchers simply used the worse of the two forms. It could also very 
well be a function of Montana's relatively sparse population; perhaps 
crowding effects simply are not yet felt by the median voters in 
Montana's counties.
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Estimates will be made for general expenditures (GENX) as well as 
expenditures in the functional areas of education (EDUC), highways 
(HIWA), welfare (WELF). hospitals (HOSP), health (HEAL), police (POLI), 
natural resources and parks and recreation (NRPR), and all other (OTHR), 
a catch-all category that includes correction, financial administration, 
general control, public buildings, ir-erest on debt, unallocable 
spending, and sewerage and sanitation.
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
Population or population density has traditionally been included- in 
such models. They have usually been found to be statistically 
significant and can be interpreted as taste and preference variables. 
This model will use 1980 population (PP) and the percentage of the 
population living in urban areas in that year (RB) as independent 
variables. The estimated coefficients for these variables are expected 
to be positive. It is reasonable to assume that those living in more 
populous areas will prefer more of certain public goods and services, 
like paved streets and police protection, than those living in less 
densely populated areas. It is also equally likely that city dwellers 
prefer and have the leisure to enjoy a wider variety of public goods and 
services, such as parks, museums, libraries, etc. Finally, those who 
require public assistance of some sort will likely migrate to densely 
populated areas, since public assistance is generally more readily 
available and available in more generous quantities in urban areas.
Also, urbanites may well have fewer, or at least different, subsistence
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living alternatives available to them and may thus be reliant on a 
different mix of public goods with a different price tag.
According to the median voter model outlined in Chapter Two, a proper 
specification must include the traditional demand function variables of 
"tax price" (TS) and median income in the county (MY). Median income, 
as was explained before, is used because it is supposed to be the income 
of the decisive voter in the community. The income variable chosen for 
this model is median family income in each county in 1979. The 
coefficient for this variable is expected to be positive. The magnitude 
of the coefficient will certainly vary from one geographic area to 
another and the wide variation of estimated income elasticities in past 
studies makes prediction of the coefficient's magnitude precarious.
The tax price is in truth a tax share : it is computed as the 1980 
taxable value of the home with the median value (assumed to belong to 
the decisive voter) divided by the taxable value of the entire tax base 
in that year. The estimated coefficient for this "price" is expected to 
be negative. However, the completeness of this formulation of "price" 
is somewhat questionable. On the one hand, the variable seems 
appropriate because the property tax is the major own-source tax revenue 
available to Montana counties and the only tax for which the county 
commissioners (presumably) can be held responsible by the voters. 
Counties in Montana receive shares of some of the State's excise taxes, 
such as those on alcohol and gasoline, but those shares are relatively 
small when compared to the revenues produced by the property tax. Also, 
even though these taxes are paid by the residents of the counties, 
county voters probably do not perceive the connection between these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 2
excise taxes and the goods and services provided by county governments. 
Thus, any tax price variable constructed for county voters should 
indeed be based on property values.
A problem arises, however, in that a substantial amount of the 
taxed property is owned by nonresidents of the counties containing 
property. The owners of such property must pay taxes but do not get to 
vote for (or against) the county commissioners who levy the mills 
against taxable value. Because the tax levy is a function of all 
taxable property in the jurisdiction, not just that owned by residents, 
the resident's perception of property taxes as a "price" paid for public 
goods and services received is blurred. The county's voters do not have 
to bear the entirety of even the tax-financed portion of the cost of 
publicly provided goods and services, let alone the portion financed 
through non-tax revenues.
Since this "tax price" variable is a very imperfect measure of what 
taxpayers actually pay for their public goods, additional explanatory 
variables will be included to help account for the voters' ability to 
make nonresidents pay for the public goods and services enjoyed by 
residents. A proxy for the ability of taxpayers to export taxes to 
nonresidents (XP) will be included as an explanatory variable. This 
proxy will consist of the proportion of the county's property tax base 
composed of net and gross proceeds, mining royalties, and utility 
property. This portion of the property tax base is the portion most 
likely owned by nonresidents. The higher the proportion of this kind of 
property in the jurisdiction, the more likely residents will be to
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approve of higher county government expenditures. The coefficient for 
this variable is expected to be positive.
The absolute size of the county's tax base per capita will also be 
included in the model (TB). It is expected that voters will wish to 
make not only nonresidents but also other residents pay for their public 
goods and services. The fact that a uniform county mill levy is applied 
to all taxable property in the jurisdiction allows the voter to spread 
the cost of public goods among all taxpayers, regardless of residence. 
Assuming the non-tax portion of the financing for public goods remains 
unchanged, the larger the tax base the lower the cost to the individual 
for a particular level of public expenditure. Thus, the tax base, as 
well as the ability to export taxes, can be thought of as supplements of 
sorts to the "tax price;" they acts a other indicators of the marginal 
cost accruing to the taxpayer/voter for his or her public goods and 
services. These two variables can also be thought of as indicators of 
wealth. They represent the wealth available for use by the taxpayer, 
regardless of the portion of that wealth he or she owns. Regardless of 
whether these variables are thought of as (inversely proportional) 
indicators of marginal cost, indicators of wealth, or both, their 
estimated coefficients should be expected to be positive.
The distribution of income in the jurisdiction is expected to 
affect the level of public expenditures, although economic theory is of 
little help in determining the direction or magnitude of this 
relationship. The proportion of the county's families living below the 
federally defined poverty level (PV) will be used to measure such 
distribution. On the one hand, the greater this proportion, the greater
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
54
the need for public goods such as welfare and possibly certain types of 
public health expenditures. In fact, state and federal laws may, in 
effect, mandate some proportionality between this measure of income and 
welfare spending. Furthermore, the median voter may very well have 
feelings of "public regardingness" towards those living in poverty and 
may choose to subsidize them. However, in the unlikely case that the 
median voter has an income which places him below the poverty level, he 
will be less willing and /or able to support such expenditures. No 
expectations for the size or sign of this coefficient are hypothesized.
The diversity of funding for county government necessitates that 
non-tax sources of revenue be accounted for in the model. Thus 
intergovernmental transfer payments from the State and federal 
governments (TF) and charges and miscellaneous fees (CG) for fiscal 1982 
are Included as Independent variables. Inclusion of these variables in 
all of the equations would be preferred, but it is not possible (at 
least, no way was found) to disaggregate these amounts according to the 
functional spending categories used. Thus, It will only be appropriate 
to use these two variables for the general expenditures equation.
It Is likely that both of these types of funds are thought of as "free" 
money by the voter. This, of course, is not strictly true. Taxpayers 
In the county pay a small portion of the taxes which finance grants from 
higher levels of government, but they probably do not perceive the 
connection between these taxes paid to the State and federal governments 
and the financing of county-provided goods and services. Even if they 
do see the connection, they are likely to perceive such financing as 
another way of having nonresidents pay for a larger share of local goods
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and services. Such transfers can also be thought of as price 
indicators. They allow voter/consumers to acquire more public goods 
without incurring greater costs.*®
The estimated coefficient for intergovernmental transfer payments 
is expected to be positive in both the linear and log-linear regression 
models. Because much of such transfer payments come with matching funds 
requirements, the coefficient is expected to be greater than unity in 
the linear model. Charges and fees are also very likely seen as quite 
different from taxes, as they are not mandatory. The estimated 
coefficient for this variable is also expected to be positive in both 
the linear and log-linear equations, but nothing can be said of its 
expected magnitude.
Finally, two independent variables will be included in the model to 
test the maintained hypothesis of this study--that employment growth 
affects local government expenditures in a positive way. Employment 
growth will be measured as percentage changes in employment over a ten- 
year period, 1970 to 1980. Two broad employment categories will be 
used. Employment in basic Industries (BA) will measure the percentage 
change in the number of employed persons in the areas of agriculture, 
forestry, fisheries, mining, construction, manufacturing,
*®Following Smith's reasoning, such transfers are also seen as 
prices by government. However, their effect from local governments' 
perspective is to reduce the cost of supplying additional public goods 
and services. For Smith, transfer payments were a supply variable. Yet 
they are here included in the median voter's demand schedule. That a 
"price" (marginal cost) variable appears in both supply and demand 
functions should not be surprising, as price does double duty in the 
supply/demand system for private goods and services. This same 
reasoning can be applied to the variables representing the size of the 
tax base, the ability to export taxes, and charges and fees.
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transportation, communication, and utilities. Employment change in all 
other industries constitutes nonbasic employment (NB). The changes in 
employment will be calculated as the 1980 employment figure less the 
1970 employment figure, all divided by the 1970 figure. The estimated 
coefficients are expected to be positive for both of these variables. 
Growth in employment should create a need for public services and make 
the electorate more optimistic about its ability to maintain a higher 
level of public expenditures. These variables could conceivably be 
thought of also as indicators of the political strength of business. 
Previous researchers have reasoned that great size amounts to great 
political strength and have thus hypothesized positive coefficients for 
employment variables. However, employment growth may be a somewhat 
dubious indicator of political clout. The magnitudes of these 
coefficients are not expected to be the same, and they are expected to 
be positive. This expectation is based on increased need and the 
electorate's ability to pay rationale, not increased political power for 
business.
The single equation to be statistically estimated several times 
will be;
G - f(RB, XP, NB. TX, BA. PV. TB, MY, PP. TF. CG)
where G represents government expenditures. The dependent variables, 
general expenditures and each of the variables representing spending in 
the functional categories, will be substituted for G in turn. Variables 
used in the model are as follows:
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
57
DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES IN THE MODEL
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
GENX = general expenditures 
EDUC = education expenditures 
HIWA — highway expenditures 
WELF “ welfare expenditures 
HOSP = hospital expenditures 
HEAL = health expenditures 
POLI = police expenditures
NRPR = natural resource and park expenditures 
OTHR =* other expenditures
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
PP =s= population
RB = urbanization
MY = median family income
PV = percent of families below poverty level 
TS = "tax price" (tax share)
XP = the ability to export property taxes 
TB = taxable property value 
TF *■ intergovernmental transfer payments 
CG = charges and fees
BA = employment change in "basic" industries
NB = employment change in "nonbasic" industries
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSIONS
This chapter reports the results of the regressions. Three tables 
are presented. The first summarizes the results of the linear 
regressions. The second table gives the results of the log-linear 
regressions. The final table shows the simple Pearson correlation 
coefficients between each pair of the independent variables. Each cell 
of the results tables contains a variable's estimated coefficient, the 
coefficient's t-statistic, and its p-value. The p-value gives the 
actual level of statistical significance of the coefficient. It 
provides an alternative to use of the classical 0.05 cut-off point for 
statistical significance. The t-statistics are made somewhat 
superfluous by the inclusion of the p-values, but they are reported 
because economists are more familiar with them than with p-values.
Also, inclusion of the t-statistics allows comparison of this model's 
statistical "fit" of the data with that of other studies.
In general, the statistical goodness of fit of both the linear and 
log-linear regression models, as measured by R^ and the F statistic, is 
acceptable and, in fact, remarkably high in the cases of general 
expenditures and spending on education. The F statistics are almost 
always quite high, the one exception being the regressions for hospital 
spending (HOSP), indicating that most equations explain far more of the 
variation in the dependent variables than is left unexplained. The
58
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LINEAR
Dep.
Var. CONST RB XP NB TS BA PV
B 4086.35 15.41 27.97 141.01 29595.42 -484.80 -8006.45
GENX t 1.22 1.47 2.35 0.20 0.09 -0.59 -1.21
P 0.23 0,15 0.02 0.85 0.93 0.56 0.23
B -2661.22 -2.07 14.60 154.45 -41019.85 427.53 2930.29
EDUC t -1.28 -0.31 1.92 -0.12 -0.20 0.88 0.70
P 0.20 0.76 0.06 0.91 0.84 0.39 0.49
B -193.71 -0.76 9.41 295.44 -126072.30 384.45 -517.99
HIWA t -0.15 -0.18 1.95 1.01 -0.98 1.20 -1.95
P 0.88 0.86 0.06 0.32 0.33 0.22 0.85
B 1088.38 0.43 0.45 -336.70 131568.80 575.93 -2866.50
WELF t 0.66 0.08 0.08 -0.92 0.82 1.49 0.87
P 0.51 0.94 0.94 0.36 0.42 0.14 0.39
B -285.02 2.48 4.14 -134.16 19385.51 -350.63 22.23
HOSP t -0.24 0.64 0.93 -0.50 0.16 1.23 0.01
P 0.81 0.53 0.36 0.62 0.87 0.22 0.99
B 127.94 1.37 -0.10 -12.60 13901.76 -15.98 -341.75
HEAL t 0.31 1.03 -0.07 -0.14 0.35 -0.17 -0.41
P 0.76 0.31 0.95 0.89 0.73 0.87 0.68
B -377.52 0.89 -0.38 219.72 2906.61 33.54 500.94POLI t 0.94 0.69 -0.26 2.45 0.07 0.35 0.62
P 0.35 0.50 0.80 0.02 0.94 0.72 0.54
B -23.62 -1.07 0.75 -210.51 72968.67 -1.17 -144.30NRPR t -0.04 -0.51 0.32 1.46 1.15 -0.01 -0.11
P 0.98 0.61 0.75 0.15 0.26 0.99 0.91
B -2043.86 0.55 -10.11 261.00 -76548.70 11647.73 3466.76OTHR t -1.09 0.09 -1.48 0.63 -0.42 2.65 0.93
P 0.28 0.93 0.15 0.53 0.68 0.01 0.36
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REGRESSION RESULTS
TB MY PP TF CG ADJ RZ F
0.11 -0.22 0.13 1.06 1.83E-03 0.97 166.89
1. 36 -1.25 6.38 3.93 9.87
0.18 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.13 0.12 0.11 NA NA 0.90 51.52
2.53 1.12 14.19 NA NA
0.01 0.27 0.00 NA NA 0.00
-1.55E-03 0.02 0.03 NA NA 0.64 11.54
-0.05 0.30 5.74 NA NA
0.96 0.76 0.00 NA NA 0.00
0.03 -0.05 0.04 NA NA 0.57 8.95
0.67 -0.54 6.61 NA NA
0.54 0.59 0.00 NA NA 0.00
-2.75 0.02 -2.69E-03 NA NA -0.07 0.64
-0.09 0.36 0.613 NA NA
0.93 0.72 0.54 NA NA 0.76
0.01 -8.86E-03 0.01 NA NA 0.7.7 20.98
1.14 -0.04 8.81 NA NA
0.26 0.69 0.00 NA NA 0.00
8.77E-03 0.02 0.02 NA NA 0.87 39.50
0.90 0.97 11.55 NA NA
0.37 0.34 0.00 NA NA 0.00
0.03 9.70E03 0.03 NA NA 0.85 35.71
1.93 -0.28 13.43 NA NA
0.06 0.78 0.00 NA NA 0.00
0.06 0.09 0.01 NA NA 0.41 5.13
1.29 0.91 2.26 NA NA
0.21 0.37 0.03 NA NA 0.00
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LOG-LINEAR
Dep.
Var. CONST RB XP NB TS BA PV
= = = = « =
B -5.85 -4.14E-03 0.10 0.04 0.37 0.05 0.23
GENX t -1.66 -1.37 2.39 0.77 1.67 1.49 1.81
P 0.11 0.18 0.02 0.44 0.11 0.15 0.08
B -14.57 -0.01 0.20 -0.01 0.37 -0.01 0.40
EDUC t -2.42 -1.94 2.66 -0.13 0.99 -0.13 1.73
P 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.90 0.33 0.90 0.09
B -4.12 -0.01 0.10 -0.11 0.37 0.14 0.03
HIWA t -0.52 1.94 1.00 -1.01 0.75 1.65 0.09
P 0.61 0.06 0.33 0.32 0.46 0.11 0.93
B -21.40 -0.01 -0.03 0.32 1.91 0.32 -0.36
WELF t -0.95 -0.59 -0.11 -1.34 1.36 1.34 -0.42
P 0.35 0.56 0.92 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.68
B -41.83 -0.51 -4.18 -4.08 23.73 6.13 6.49
HOSP t -0.15 -2.00 -1.23 -1.08 1.37 2.09 0.62
P 0.88 0.05 0.23 0.29 0.18 0.04 0.54
B -29.00 -2.66E-03 0.39 0.08 0.81 -0.34 0.74
HEAL t -1.59 -1.60 1.77 0.34 0.72 -1.77 1.07
P 0.12 0.87 0.09 0.74 0.48 0.09 0.29
6 -9.61 0.01 0.08 0.29 0.06 5.26E- 03 1.36E03
POLI t -1.01 1.17 0.65 2.20 0.10 0.05 0.00
P 0.32 0.25 0.52 0.04 0.92 0.96 0.99
B -50.37 -0.02 0.25 0.08 2.47 -0.38 1.73NRPR t -2.82 -1.02 1.16 -0.33 2.22 -2.03 2.56
P 0.01 0.32 0.25 0.75 0.03 0.05 0.02
B -171.36 0.07 -1.29 -1.88 19.87 -0.91 2.99OTHR t -1.81 0.84 -1.12 -1.46 3.38 -0.91 0.83
P 0.08 0.41 0.27 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.41
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6 2
TB MY PP TF CG ADJ RZ F
"  “
---------------- -------------
0.57 0.07 0 . 80 0.20 0.29 0.98 140.67
2.42 0.18 3.56 2.90 6 66
0.02 0.86 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.79 0. 76 1.30 NA NA 0.92 53.79
2.00 1.09 3 . 73 NA NA
0,06 0.29 0.00 NA NA 0.00
0.82 -0.36 1.18 NA NA 0.81 19 . 55
I. 57 -0.39 2.58 NA NA
0.13 0.70 0.02 NA NA 0.00
1.89 0.21 2.78 NA NA 0.62 8.10
1.27 1.08 2.13 NA NA
0.21 0.94 0.04 NA NA 0.00
28.94 -18.84 23.77 NA NA 0.10 1.46
1.58 -0.58 1.49 NA NA
0.12 0.56 0.15 NA NA 0.21
0.84 1.78 1.86 NA NA 0.70 10.94
0.70 0.84 1.77 NA NA
0.49 0.41 0.09 NA NA 0.00
0.08 0.74 0.85 NA NA 0.86 26.86
0.13 0.67 1.56 NA NA
0.90 0.51 0.13 NA NA 0.00
2.60 2.88 3.43 NA NA 0.71 11.38
2.21 1.39 3.33 NA NA
0.03 0.17 0.00 NA NA 0.00
20.09 4.14 17.77 NA NA 0.31 2.95
3.23 0.38 3.27 NA NA
0.00 0.71 0.00 NA NA 0.01
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MATRIX OF SIMPLE CORRELATIONS 
AMONG THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
MY PV TS TB XP TF CG PP RB BA NB
MY I. 00 - . 79 - .19 - .03 - .02 .51 .60 . 55 . 71 .40 .41
PV - .79 1.00 .07 .23 .17 - .37 -.35 - .41 - . 46 - .22 - .43
TS -.19 .07 1.00 - . 20 -.15 - .17 - .16 - .16 - .22 .07 - .01
TB - .03 . 23 - .20 1. 00 .72 - .17 - .05 - .29 - . 17 - .03 - . 13
XP - .02 .17 - . 15 .72 1.00 - .20 - .14 - .31 - .12 .05 .01
TF .51 - .37 - .17 - .17 - .20 1.00 .70 .84 .57 .23 .36
CG .60 - . 35 - .16 - .05 - .14 .70 1.00 .81 .55 .49 .36
PP . 55 - .41 - . 16 - .29 -.31 .84 .82 1.00 . 66 .30 .36
RB .71 - .46 - .22 -.17 - .12 .57 .55 .66 1.00 .23 .18
BA .40 .22 .07 - .03 .05 .23 .49 . 30 .23 1.00 .41
NB .41 - .43 -.01 - .13 .01 .36 .36 . 36 .18 .41 1.00
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values for show the linear equations for general expenditures and 
spending in all functional areas except welfare, hospitals, and other 
spending compare favorably to single equation models in previous 
studies. The linear equation for welfare spending yielded an 
acceptable, though hardly outstanding, R^. The equations for hospital 
and other spending, though, are quite disappointing. Much the same can 
be said for the statistical "fit” of the log-linear equations to the 
data; the equations are generally acceptable or better, with the 
exception of those for welfare and other spending.
Also, it is the coefficients of the same independent variables 
which often are statistically significant in both the linear and log-, 
linear forms. Because the estimates for the coefficients in the log- 
linear equations show much the same pattern of statistical significance 
as those in the linear equations, little is to be gained by discussing 
both sets of regressions. The log-linear formulation has one advantage 
over the linear form, however; it has the virtue of producing 
coefficients that economists can interpret as elasticities. For these 
reasons, the discussion will be confined for the most part to the 
performance of the variables in the log-linear models.
The results of the regressions for general expenditures and 
spending in all functional areas show that the population variable's 
coefficient is the coefficient which is most frequently statistically 
significant. It is also positive, as was expected. Except for the 
regressions for hospital expenditures, these coefficients are always 
significant at the 0.09 level or below. They are statistically
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significant at or below the 0.05 level for general expenditures and for 
five of the eight functional spending categories.
The urbanization variable, however, does not perform nearly as well 
in these models. That its coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 0.06 level or below in the log-linear regressions for three 
functional areas, education, highways, and hospitals, is somewhat 
encouraging. However, the regression for hospitals explains so little 
of the variation in spending that the statistical significance of the 
coefficient means little, if anything. The equations for education and 
highway spending do, however, explain substantial portions of the 
spending in these areas, and the statistical significance of the 
urbanization coefficients probably has theoretical importance here as 
well. The negative sign on these coefficients indicates that some 
consumption or production economies are enjoyed as urbanization 
increases. This should not be too surprising in light of the fact that 
Montana is quite sparsely populated and even urban areas, as defined by 
the Census Bureau, are small and sparsely populated by national 
standards.
The general statistical insignificance of the "traditional demand 
variables," tax price and median income, in these models was quite 
disappointing--especially since the models were cast in the mold of the 
previously quite successful median voter model. The coefficient for tax 
price did not even once in the log-linear models have the theoretically 
correct (negative) sign that one would expect of a price variable. (It 
did display a negative sign for three functional areas in the linear 
models: however, even these coefficients were not statistically
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significant at any acceptable level.) One must conclude that whatever 
role this measure of taxes plays in the determination of public 
spending, it is not as a simple price.
The estimated coefficient for median income was not statistically 
significant for any of the regression equations.^® Along with the poor 
showing of the "tax price" coefficients, this is strong evidence that 
county government expenditures, at least in Montana, are not properly 
modeled as the quantity variable in a taxpayer's demand function. That 
these demand function variables do so poorly in these models is quite 
surprising in light of their statistical importance in previous studies 
of public expenditure analysis. The cause of their statistical
insignificance may be that the incomes of taxpayers play a relatively 
minor role in the financing of county expenditures. This possibility 
seems to be supported by the fact that the coefficients for the
*^It should be noted here that the tax price here is not a simple 
variable at all. In fact, a number of other variables have been 
included in the model to capture the marginal cost of public goods. A 
technical problem in the estimation of coefficients for all of these 
"price" variables arises from the fact that a number of such variables 
exist and several of these variables are highly collinear with one 
another.
'‘®Again, multicollinearity may be the cause of the statistical 
insignificance of this variable's coefficient. Romer and Rosenthal have 
pointed out that collinearity between income variables and wealth-based 
variables such as those involving the tax base may be the reason for the 
lack of explanatory effect for income in some models. Collinearity 
between median income and "tax share" does not appear to be a problem 
here (r = -.185). However, multicollinearity may yet be a problem. In 
this Montana data set, median income is most highly correlated with the 
poverty variable (r = -.785) and moderately correlated with transfer 
payments (r - .513), charges and fees (r = .596), and population (r = 
.550). Median income's statistical insignificance could well be because 
of that variable's correlation with any of these others mentioned or the 
compounded effect of all correlations with other explanatory variables.
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proportion of families below the poverty level were positive in all of 
the equations in which they were statistically significant. The 
coefficients for this income distribution variable were positive and 
statistically significant for general expenditures at the 0.08 level and 
the 0.09 level for education expenditures. The coefficient for this 
variable was positive and statistically significant at an even lower 
level for natural resources spending. If taxpayer incomes were 
important for the financing of public goods and services, one would 
expect the coefficient for the median voter's income to be positive and 
statistically significant in most, if not all, of the equations, 
especially the general expenditures equation. One would also expect the 
coefficients for the income distribution variable to be negative and 
significant in many of the equations. The fact that these expectations 
were not borne out indicates that the resident taxpayer may have a much 
less powerful role in the determination of public spending than the 
median voter model implies.
Other factors Important in the finance of local goods and services 
do better in this mrdel. For instance, the size of the tax base and the 
proxy for the ability to export taxes both yield positive and 
statistically significant coefficients in the general expenditures 
model. Also, the coefficients for the tax base are positive, as 
predicted, and statistically significant in three of the functional 
areas. The coefficient for the ability to export taxes is also positive 
and significant for one of the functional areas. These two variables 
represent wealth that the taxpayer may tap to finance public goods. By 
voting for a candidate who will levy more taxes against all property in
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the county, the decisive voter or block of voters, whether at the 
economic median or not, can spread the pain of having to pay for public 
goods to others, both inside and outside the jurisdiction. He or she 
can enjoy a high level of consumption of public goods without having to 
pay the full cost. The idea that voters choose to force others to pay 
for their own consumption whenever possible should not be surprising to 
economists at all Such "free rider" behavior has long been observed in 
the behavior of consumers of private as well as public goods and 
services.
The strong positive effect which intergovernmental transfer 
payments and charges and fees have on general expenditures in these 
models supports such a theory of voter behavior. Intergovernmental 
transfers allow the cost of public goods to be spread among taxpayers 
other than those in the jurisdiction receiving the payment. The intent 
of those initiating the transfers is to induce greater public spending 
by the receiving government, and this device apparently works. Whether 
transfers induce greater local spending because the voters choose to 
take advantage of the opportunity to spread the costs or because 
politicians see the opportunity to spend without inflicting too much 
financial pain among their constituents is not addressed by statistical 
models. However, the results of this public expenditure study seem to 
be consistent with either interpretation.
The two measures of employment growth used in these models seemed 
to have little effect on the amount of public expenditures (and 
presumably on the quantity of public goods demanded). In the few cases 
in which statistically significant relationships were detected, they
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appeared to be contradictory. The estimated coefficient for basic 
employment, for instance, was statistically significant at the 0.05 
level or below only twice in the log-linear equations. In the hospital 
expenditures equation, the coefficient is positive; the basic employment 
coefficient is negative in the natural resources equation. The 
estimated coefficient for nonbasic employment was positive and 
significant in only one of the functional area equations.
These two variables were included in the model as tests of the 
maintained hypothesis that employment growth positively affects county 
government expenditures. Virtually no support was found for this 
hypothesis. If any relationship exists, it is not one which could be 
detected by a linear regression model or a log-linear model.
69
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
THE MEDIAN VOTER MODEL
The builder of any econometric model faces a dilemma in the choice 
of his or her independent variables. Because virtually any economic 
process is quite complex, several variables may be needed to describe 
that process. Thus the econometrician always runs the risk of 
misspecifying his model by omitting important variables from the model. 
The other side of the dilemma results from the likelihood that economic 
variables, particularly those relating to the same process, are likely 
to be collinear and thus cause technical problems in a multiple 
regression model. A set of single equation models such as this, with 11 
independent variables, is quite likely to suffer the ill effects of 
multicollinearity. Also the correlation matrix previously presented 
indicates
that there is substantial collinearity between several pairs of the 
variables. The predictor variables identified in the previous chapter 
as statistically significant do, in fact, "explain," by themselves, a 
great deal of the variation in the general spending of county 
governments in Montana. A log-linear regression of general expenditures 
on the five most statistically significant independent variables 
reported in the previous chapter--charges and fees, intergovernmental 
transfers, population, the size of the tax base, and the proxy for the
70
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ability to export taxes--statistically "explains" ninety seven percent 
of the variation in the log of general expenditures. However, the 
coefficients of two of these variables, population and the size of the 
tax base, seem to be quite unstable. Even though the eleven-variable 
model "explains" virtually no more of the variation in expenditures, the 
coefficients of these two variables have a value approximately double 
that in the five-variable model. Such instability indicates substantial 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables and is a sign that 
there may well be more of them than are needed in the model. The point 
of this comparison is that general expenditures can be statistically 
"explained" quite thoroughly with fewer variables than used in the 
larger model tested in this study. Furthermore, none of the 
statistically important variables happens to be one of the "traditional 
demand function variables," tax price or median income.
THE PROXIES FOR PRICE AND QUANTITY
The fact that the "traditional demand ^unction variables" of tax 
price and median income were very rarely statistically significant in 
this model may be accounted for in one of at least three ways. Two 
explanations are theoretical and remaining is technical.
A possible explanation of the poor showing of tax price in this 
model is that one or more of the many assumptions used to construct the 
demand relationship in the median voter model was unrealistic. These 
assumptions are of three main types. First, the assumption that 
expenditures are a valid proxy for the quantity of public goods and
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services demanded Is doubtful. For this to be maintained, one must also 
assume that government is a constant cost industry and that costs do not 
vary across political jurisdictions. The constant cost assumption may 
be somewhat reasonable within a very narrow range of output, but it 
would be surprising indeed if unit costs remained unchanged as 
government oucput changed greatly. Structural differences in 
government, party and ideological differences in politicians, and 
variations in the prices of private goods from place to place make the 
second of these underlying assumptions untenable.
The second type of assumption allows tax share, or "tax price," to 
be interpreted in the same way as the price of a private good or service 
in traditional demand analysis. The flaw in this assumption is the 
formulation of this "price." The "tax price" variable in this model was 
the ratio of the taxable value of the median-valued home in the county 
to the taxable value of all taxed property in the county. For such a 
formulation to be interpreted as a price faced by voters (who "choose" 
an expenditure level), non-residents must own no residential property in 
the county and residents must own no nonresidential property. Only in 
such circumstances can this measure of tax price be the median voter's 
true share of the tax burden.
Recognizing that such a distribution of the tax base is improbable, 
previous researchers have still been willing to use this measure as a 
proxy for the marginal cost faced by taxpayers. They have constructed 
models which appear quite sound, at least when judged by statistical 
criteria. That the estimated coefficient of "tax price" did not show up 
in this study as statistically significant at an acceptable level, and
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often had the theoretically Incorrect sign, may be the result of poor 
craftsmanship on the part of this researcher in the construction of the 
model. It could also be that previous researchers were simply lucky in 
their choice of data sets and/or explanatory variables.
The third type of assumption is that which has the voter perceiving 
the tax share as his or her marginal cost for the public goods received. 
This assumption is vulnerable whenever expenditures are determined in a 
legislative body and not a market. Public expenditures are most often 
determined in some sort of legislature, such as a council, commission. 
House of Representatives, or Senate. They are never determined in a 
market; even when levies are voted on directly, the voter has only two 
options and can not bargain for a third. Prices in the private market 
can be relied upon to give the consumer very definite information about 
the marginal cost of a good or service. Proponents of the median voter 
theory maintain that analogous information is offered to the voter in 
political campaigns. It is almost a commonplace, though, that voters 
get very indefinite information from the political candidates with whom 
they supposedly place their purchase orders. Furthermore, the 
legislator's opportunities for strategizing, the fact that not all 
citizens use and enjoy all public goods equally (even if they have equal 
access), and the prevalence of general fund financing make the voter's 
job of identifying the tax dollars he pays as financing any particular 
public goods he receives nearly impossible.
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A PUBLIC FINANCE ALTERNATIVE
The second theoretical explanation for the failure of the median 
voter model in this study encompasses the roles of both the "tax price” 
and median income variables. It also suggests that the median voter 
model should be augmented with a number of variables of the type used 
in this study. The performance of a number of variables that describe 
the method of financing government expenditures in the linear models 
tested, the tax export variable (XP), size of the property tax base per 
capita (TB), transfer payments (TF), and charges and fees CG), suggests 
that voters, politicians, or both pay as much or more attention to who 
pays as to how much is paid for public goods and services. The ability 
to spread the cost of public goods by taxing the property of 
nonresidents of the jurisdiction and other residents, accepting revenues 
(someone else's tax dollars) from higher levels of government, or 
collecting fees from the users of particular public goods was embodied 
in several of the statistically significant variables in this model. 
Together with the influence of population they "explained" almost all 
the variation in general expenditures and a substantial portion of the 
spending in the functional areas. The strength of these variables may 
point to the reason for the weakness of "tax price" and median income.
The variables mentioned above have been justified in the median 
voter's demand schedule as supplements to "tax price." Their presence 
in the model helps to capture that voter's true marginal cost of public 
goods. However, they may also be interpreted as variables in the supply 
schedule of local government. That there is some overlap of variables
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in the supply and demand functions of an economic system does not in 
itself invalidate the model, but it does point to a possible cause for 
concern. The demand function of the median voter presented here may not 
be adequately identifled--i .e . distinguished from local government's 
supply function.
Identification may be viewed as a technical problem in econometrics 
which is caused by an improper choice of variables included and excluded 
in each equation in the economic system. Improper identification makes 
it impossible for the investigator to tell which function in the system 
is being statistically estimated. In the case of a system "explaining" 
the supply and demand of public goods, a potential misidentification of 
the demand function will make it impossible to determine whether the 
supply function, the demand function, or some combination of the two is 
being estimated.
An equation in an economic system is identified by the variables it 
does not contain. This fact suggests a solution to the identification 
dilemma: review the equation in question to insure that it does not 
contain too many important explanatory variables appearing in the other 
equations of the system. The solution is formalized as the "order 
condition" for identification and can be stated as the requirement that 
the number of excluded exogenous variables must be greater than or equal 
to the number of included endogenous variables less one.^® Such a 
solution may appear a bit too ad hoc, since the supply equation in the 
system in question has not been formally specified. However, one can
49peter Kennedy. A Guide to Econometrics. 2nd Ed. (Cambridge 
Massachusetts: MIT press) p. 138.
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probably safely say that the supply equation in a public goods system 
would contain such common supply variables as lagged prices of public 
goods, leftover stocks, costs of physical factors of production, and 
technology indicators. This list of probable indicators would appear to 
adequately identify the median voter's demand schedule as it is 
expressed here.since these variables do not appear in the demand 
equation.
Montana county taxpayers, in fiscal 1981-82, actually financed 
surprisingly little of their respective county's general expenditures.
On average, among the 54 counties in this study, the difference between 
general expenditures and the sum of intergovernmental transfers and 
charges and fees accounted for only sixty four percent of county general 
expenditures. Citizens of three counties --Treasure. Granite, and 
Lincoln--actually financed less than half of county general expenditures 
with their own tax dollars. The highest paying citizens, those of 
Blaine county, paid for only eighty six percent of general expenditures 
with their tax dollars. With less than two thirds of county general 
expenditures being financed with locally raised tax dollars, and much of 
that burden being exported to nonresidents and the rest being spread 
among many residents, the share of the median voter might well be 
expected to have little statistical influence in a regression model.
LIMITATIONS OF THE REGRESSION MODEL
The final possible explanation of the failure of the estimated 
coefficients of "tax price" and median income to show up as
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statistically significant is that a regression model, such as the one 
used here, can only measure linear relationships between variables (or 
transformed variables). If either or both "tax price" and median income 
were closely related to expenditures in some nonlinear manner, the 
relationship would not be detected by a regression model. This appears 
to be the case for the data used in this study.
Simple plots of median income with general expenditures and 
spending in all functional areas show a pattern of expenditures 
increasing with increasing income, although this pattern is not nearly 
so pronounced for some spending categories as others. If one can 
interpret expenditures as a proxy for quantity (which is admittedly 
doubtful) , this appears to be the relationship one would observe in a 
demand function.
The case for the redemption of the "tax price" variable is not 
quite so strong, but it is also encouraging for those who would like to 
think the taxpayer has something to say in the spending of his or her 
money. When "tax price" is plotted against the expenditure figures, 
most cases are clustered near the origins (see appendix B). However, a 
few are scattered along the axes. Only a little imagination is required 
to see a line concave to the origin in what could be a diagram of a 
demand function. Furthermore, the clustering of cases near the origin 
is greatly, although not entirely, relieved by the exclusion of a single 
outlier. The plots on the following page show this clustering effect 
and its partial remedy. The first plot shows the relationship of 
general expenditures and "taxprice" (TX) for all 54 cases in the samplt.e .
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The second plot shows that of general expenditures and "taxprice" for 5 3 
cases (54 cases less the outlier).
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
One must conclude that county government spending In Montana, for 
the period tested, was not significantly affected by changes in 
employment. If the employment variables had been important, they 
probably would have been statistically "significant" in the regression 
models tested. It is true that there may be some non-linear 
relationship between county expenditures and employment changes, but no 
such relationship could be detected through examination of plots of 
these variables. This study turned up no evidence to support a 
statistical relationship. Employment variables are probably not 
appropriate for use in future public expenditure research, at least for 
the foreseeable future.
The statistical insignificance of median income in the models 
tested indicates that the level of county expenditures in Montana in 
fiscal 1982 was being determined by forces other than the ability of the 
local voter to pay for those expenditures. One is tempted to conclude 
that the "tax price" variable was statistically insignificant for much 
the same reason. However, the use of a tax-related variable still seems 
sound conceptually. It could well be that a better formulated tax 
variable would appear statistically significant in a regression model.
Both taxes and incomes have theoretical importance in public 
expenditure analysis; any model of public expenditure determination 
which omits them will be seriously misspecified. Any future public 
expenditure model should contain these variables; the magnitude of the
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roles of these variables In the determination of public expenditures 
should be decided through empirical analysis, and these roles will most 
likely be different for data from different times and places.
The formulation of both variables in the median voter model, 
especially that of "tax price." is questionable. The problem in 
distinguishing the portion of taxes paid by county residents (who are 
potential voters) from those paid by nonresidents (who are not) has been 
psi'ticularly problematic in the model tested here. A measure of the 
"price" paid by local voters should include only taxes paid by county 
residents, and the "tax price" variable used here clearly does not make 
this distinction. Further research into the distribution of ownership 
of taxed property among residents and nonresidents is necessary for the 
formulation of a more accurate "price" variable. If this distribution 
between residents and non residents can be accurately determined, the 
"price" variable can be greatly improved and the ability to export taxes 
to nonresidents could also be calculated much more precisely.
Economists who use the median voter model most often assume the 
voter at the political median is the voter at the economic median as 
well. The model thus requires the use of median income as an 
independent variable. As discussed earlier, this assumption is dubious. 
Models which operate on median income values should be compared in the 
future to those using mean income and income at other fractiles. The 
question of which to use becomes an empirical, not a theoretical, 
question.
While the median voter model has performed well in analyses of 
public spending in other times and places, the model fit the Montana
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data presented here only because it had been greatly modified. It would 
appear that the weaknesses of the median voter model were made apparent 
by the inclusion in the model of the other public finance variables 
discussed above. When these variables were included in the analysis, 
they made the median income and tax share variables statistically 
superfluous. The median voter model has served as a guide to the 
formulation of this model, though. In particular, the "demand 
function" tenor of the model has led this researcher to focus on the 
marginal cost faced by the decisive voter in his or her acquisition of 
public goods, as well as the portion of the total cost of public goods 
and services which the voter can put off onto nonvoters (nonresidents). 
Ultimately, someone must pay for such goods and the inclusion of a 
variable or set of variables which reflect this required payment seems a 
significant advance in the structure of the model. The marginal cost 
variables identified can also be thought of as public sector finance 
variables. Thus, a fruitful course for future research in the area of 
public expenditure analysis will likely be concentration on these 
methods of finance and measurement of these methods.
^°This is demonstrated by a "stepwise" regression process, 
beginning with the most elementary specification of the demand function. 
When general expenditures is regressed on "tax price" and median income 
alone, the coefficients of the two independent variables both have the 
theoretically correct sign (positive for income, negative for price). 
While the coefficient for "tax price" is statistically insignificant at 
an acceptable level of confidence,that for median income is quite 
significant (t = 5.254, p = .0000). Introduction of the alternative cost 
(and wealth) variables--tax base per capita (TB), the ability to export 
taxes (XP), intergovernmental transfers (TF). and charges and fees (CG)- 
-"washes out" the statistical significance of income. The latter two 
variables in particular, seem to do the most to overshadow median income 
in the model.
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Intergovernmental transfer payments are among these cost variables. 
Such transfers Increased dramatically In almost all parts of the U.S. In 
the first thirty five years of the post-war era. They have been 
decreasing radically for the last eight years, at least In most places. 
The results of this analysis of Montana county expenditures Indicates 
that local voters and/or politicians are quite willing to Increase 
public expenditures If those expenditures will be matched by "outside" 
money from the Federal or State governments. Unfortunately, transfer 
payment figures were available only In highly aggregated form and, for 
this study, could only be used for the general expenditures equations.
Research should be done with an eye towards eventually 
disaggregating such Intergovernmental transfer figures according to 
functional spending categories. County spending responses should also 
vary with differing origins of the transfers (State vs. federal) and 
differing requirements of such transfers for matching monies. Research 
In these areas Is needed as well. Likewise, a disaggregation of the 
figures for charges and user fees by the spending categories for which 
they are used would be quite fruitful.
The use of debt finance Is also theoretically Important to public 
expenditure determination. Thus, further research Is needed Into the 
use and legal limits on the use of this finance tool by local 
governments.
Modification of the median voter model by Including the marginal 
cost/public finance variables Identified (or Improvements on them) would 
seem to be advised. Ordinary least squares seems to be an adequate tool 
for the testing of such models, and the variables suggested above. If
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they can be developed, will probably provide a superior statistical 
"explanation” as well as a more insightful theoretical explanation of 
the complex process which determines public spending.
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